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ABSTRACT 
This research utilizes the JTAC mission and applies the VIRT concept of smart-
push information delivery.  Current efforts within DoD focus on achieving a virtual world 
where all information becomes available through the GIG.  This pull approach to 
information delivery does not adequately address the value of information and the 
absolute requirement to deliver it to the lowest levels when and where needed.  The 
current DoD enterprise-wide mentality of IT implementation does not focus on where 
best to leverage IT in order to achieve an immediate increase in capability.  VIRT, as 
demonstrated in this research, provides an excellent place to start and a great opportunity 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE JOINT MISSION 
Today’s warrior understands the importance in utilizing technology to gain and 
maintain advantage over his enemies.  DoD faces the challenge of utilizing new and 
existing technology to ensure success in the battle-space of today and tomorrow.  Net-
Centric Warfare (NCW) has become a buzzword, but how does the warfighter translate 
this concept into an enabling capability?  Specifically, how does the military transform 
itself into a truly network centric force spanning all services? 
The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as one of the nine unified commands faces 
the unique mission of uniting and supporting the efforts of the other geographic 
commanders.  As a result, the JFCOM ardently advocates jointness within the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  JFCOM faces some extreme challenges.  A few of these 
challenges derive from the cultural differences among the services and the myriad 
technological applications.  In order for the DoD to achieve success today and in the 
future, these challenges must be overcome.  Each service can no longer pursue missions 
based entirely on inherent capabilities.  Any Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) within 
the DoD must focus on a unity of effort amongst the services.  How does the military take 
such a large task and translate it into real capabilities on the ground?  What enabling 
technologies exist?  What road map should DoD follow?  
1. Purpose of Research 
This thesis seeks to identify current efforts to enable a net centric force, e.g., the 
Global Information Grid (GIG), and presents an alternative.  This alternative provides 
value by applying smarter information management concepts to a typical mission profile.  
The JFCOM searches for technologies and ideas they can field to bridge the military 
services and achieve synergy among disparate sensor information in order to empower a 
networked force.   Where should this effort begin and how long does the DoD have to 
investigate and institute technologies that will translate to real capabilities within the 
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battlespace?  Clearly our potential rivals will not stand still and wait.  They too seek 
better, faster ways to achieve victory in an increasingly networked world. 
The current approach of pulling information may provide some level of benefit to 
the warfighter but will take a great deal of time to achieve.  Even if the GIG and its pull 
approach to information access can be made to work, it may not provide the warfighter 
all the information he requires.  This paper offers a solution to information delivery by 
identifying smart push as a better alternative to the current as-is situation in the field.  
This smart push delivery can be provided faster and incorporate pre-existing sensors.  
The best way to demonstrate the true benefits of smart push over current approaches lies 
in analyzing a use-case centered on a real mission scenario.   
The use-case goes a long way in describing certain behaviors of a system or entity 
within a system.  The actors within the use-case illustrate well the interaction of 
components and other actors within an event.  The event in question stems from the view 
point of the main actor.  The scenario considered in this paper centers around the Joint 
Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and a typical JTAC mission.  By considering current 
technology employment in a JTAC mission and comparing it to a smart push alternative, 
the true benefits of the alternative become apparent.  The JTAC scenario provides a very 
valuable use-case for a future demonstration or experimentation which will show in a 
measureable manner the true benefits from a hypothetical smart push of information. 
By comparing approaches it becomes clear that the smart push of information 
offers the quickest way toward warrior support with the least amount of time.  This thesis 
supports this view. 
2. Joint Vision 2020 
Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June of 2000 
guides the military with the overall goal of “…the creation of a force that is dominant 
across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, 
preeminent in any form of conflict.”1 This presents a tall order.  For some time now the 
                                                 
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision, 1. 
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United States has recognized the need to embark upon this journey of technological and 
cultural evolution.  In 1986, President Reagan signed Public Law 99-433 most commonly 
known as the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act.  This law gave more power to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and resolved the problem of a unified command of the services 
during joint combat. JV2020 recognizes that, “The integration of core competencies 
provided by the individual Services is essential to the joint team. To build the most 
effective force for 2020, we must be fully joint.”2  What does being fully joint mean and 
how does the DoD take advantage of technology to make jointness a reality?   
The mission of the military, fighting and winning our nations’ wars, has not 
changed.  The means to accomplish the winning of wars now orients toward the military 
gaining and maintaining “full spectrum dominance.”3 The idea of full spectrum 
dominance “means the ability of U.S. forces, operating alone or with allies, to defeat any 
adversary and control any situation across the range of military operations.”4  So, while 
full spectrum dominance may be the goal, the modus operandi involves the military 
forging new capabilities centered around dominant maneuver, precision engagement, 
focused logistics and full dimensional protection.  All of these capabilities include 
technology as an enabler. This increased use of technology leads to a focus on the 
network as an organizing principle for warfighting. 
3. Network Centric Warfare/Operations 
Martin van Creveld in his book Command in War stated the history of warfare 
demonstrates a keen interest in decreasing the “realm of uncertainty, resulting in a race 
between more information and the ability of technology to keep up with it.”5  This race 
continues today.  NCW characterizes “the effective linking or networking of 
                                                 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision, 3. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Jim Garamone,  “Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full Spectrum Dominance,” in American Forces 
Press Defenselink.mil, 02 June 2000. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45289 
Accessed January 2008. 
5 Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: The Literature and Commentaries (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1993), 148. 
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knowledgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed.  The 
networking of knowledgeable entities enables them to share information and collaborate 
to develop shared awareness, and also … achieve self synchronization.  The net result is 
increased combat power.”6  This increase in combat power comes in the form of shared 
battlespace awareness through ubiquitous interconnectivity and networking technologies.  
The use of a Common Operational Picture (COP) illustrates one aspect of NCW that will 
theoretically lead to victory through better, quicker decisions.  However, technology 
alone cannot achieve such lofty goals.  Successfully connecting all sensor information 
spread across the services does not automatically lead to results.  These data must be 
utilized by decision makers and an acceptable decision must be reached.  As a result, the 
push for NCW inside DoD does not simply involve the incorporation of new technology 
in the pursuit of improved capabilities but constitutes a new way of thinking.  “Net 
Centric Operations (NCO) is the military embodiment of transformation. It is not about 
new weapons, new technologies, or new systems, although all of these need further 
development. Transformation is actually about changing values, attitudes, beliefs, and 
ultimately, behaviors.”7   
The military’s realization that emphasis should no longer focus on parochial 
mission-specific platforms reflects revolutionary thought. The DoD must focus on 
networking people and processes to allow rapid knowledge sharing and decision-making.  
However, the latent tendency of each service to pursue its own idea of NCW continues.  
Indeed, each service adopted some form of what that particular service would term NCW.  
The Navy adopted a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) which seeks to link 
sensor data from disparate platforms to form a common track capability.  The Army 
adopted the Blue Force Tracker (BFT) as a method to track friendly or “blue” forces and 
the Marine Corps adopted its own form of BFT called Force 21 Base Command Brigade 
and Below (FBCB2).  Interoperability of technology between the various services and 
U.S. allies appear to have received only marginal attention.  This disparity may result 
                                                 
6 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare, 2d rev. ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: CCRP, 1999),  6-7. 
7 John Gartska and David Alberts, Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework Version 2.0; 
June 2004, 1. 
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from the Defense acquisition process where individual services control their own budgets 
with little effort made to align systems procurement with inter-service interoperability.  
Indeed within the same service, systems may not always operate well together.  This 
tendency to acquire capabilities in a “stovepipe” fashion must be overcome and resisted.   
If the inherent resistance within each service can be overcome and the DoD 
acquisition process modified, the true benefits from NCW might be realized.  While an 
important topic for consideration, the intent of this thesis is not to investigate or offer a 
remedy for acquisition reform.  While acquisition reform occupies the efforts of many 
within DoD, others have become focused on developing technology to increase 
accessibility and availability across multiple services.  The current effort underway to 
accomplish this interoperability and availability within the DoD involves tagging all bits 
of information using terms defined by an Extensible Mark Up Language (XML) schema 
in order to facilitate easy access and pull of required information.  Is this the best 
solution?   This may not be the best approach. 
a. XML 
XML is a subset of the Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) 
and provides a ready means for expression and transmission of data.  DoD wishes to 
mark up all data with XML tags formulated by Communities of Interest that would agree 
on the terminology and properties for each descriptive mark up.  At first glance, XML 
tags appear a very good way of adopting a Net Centric approach to information delivery.  
If everyone agrees on how to label each data category and data element, it should be easy 
for a user to pull any information from the GIG using an appropriate search tool.  The use 
of XML makes this approach seem even more attractive.  The extensibility of XML 
allows developers to select and tag data based on the users’ requirements and modify 
these choices as needed.  However, the monumental task of forming Communities of 
Interest and getting everyone to agree on a domain ontology to underlie the tags seems 
too large of a task to accomplish in a reasonable amount of time.  This enterprise-wide 
approach, even if it can be made to work, will not render a capability tomorrow or even  
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five years from now.  The better solution – find some way to adopt a “bottom up” 
approach that could be implemented within one to two years and yield results from the 
beginning.    
b. Iterative Approach 
If JFCOM could launch a software-based approach to information 
management that would yield positive warfighting results tomorrow, what value would 
this yield?  In terms of actual dollars spent and capturing opportunities, it would be worth 
a great deal.  If large projects cannot achieve their goals in a reasonable time, then the 
capabilities they may have afforded become diminished.  Moreover, the opportunities of 
adopting technology faster, i.e. a faster, more agile force, have also been lost.  Coupling 
the slow adoption of technology with current acquisition schedules of ten years or more 
constitutes a recipe for disaster.  However, taking a page from DoD’s enterprise-wide 
approach, these Communities of Interest could be modified to form Communities of 
Practice formed around mission specific parameters.   
JFCOM should consider high-risk, important missions and focus on these 
missions first.  While it is clear that a perfect solution may not be generated from the 
outset, a software solution could be implemented that yields better information 
management without inflicting harm on the warfighter.  Instead of attempting to get 
everything correct from the outset, an evolutionary or iterative approach could be adopted 
which will allow technology to get in the hands of the warfighter faster.  Much like the 
spiral development methodology being embraced by the DoD acquisition community, a 
spiral approach to NCW information sharing could be adopted.   Why attempt to tag 
everything up front?  Why not attempt to classify missions deemed critical and start 
there.  Or, better yet, find the “low hanging fruit” such as missions deemed critical which 
may be readily addressed.    
The DoD has focused much attention lately on providing a Common 
Operational Picture (COP) to battlespace commanders.  The boots on the ground have 
become a secondary focus.  These frontline warriors don’t always require a COP, but  
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they do need information relevant to their current location and activities.  An actual 
scenario can best explain how better information management could benefit the 
warfighter on the ground. 
 B. MISSION VALUE 
The prototypical missions of securing a bridge or the taking of a hill illustrate well 
the fog of war.  These missions appear simple exercises to implement but in the chaos of 
war, they become anything but simple.  The events of March 23, 2003 in a little known 
province called An Nasiriyah, Iraq exemplify how better information management may 
have helped avoid fratricide. 
1. An Nasiriyah Friendly Fire  
Fratricide has existed in all wars and will continue to occur in the future.  
However, today’s media environment and a public less inclined to accept fatalities 
greatly increases the damage done by fratricide.  On March 23, 2003, a battalion of 
Marines tasked with securing two bridges over the Euphrates River and Saddam Canal 
came under attack.  This Battalion included Bravo Company, the Forward Command 
Post, Alpha Company and Charlie Company.  Bravo Company led the offensive across 
the southern bridge then left the main road to avoid enemy fire from what later became 
known as “ambush alley.”  Bravo Company, along with the Forward Command Post, 
subsequently got stuck in the mud and could no longer maneuver.   
Due to pre-existing radio communications problems, Charlie Company falsely 
assumed Bravo Company had moved through ambush alley and taken the northern 
bridge.  Charlie Company subsequently maneuvered across the southern bridge and 
moved through ambush alley where they began to take heavy fire.  Charlie Company 
continued through ambush alley and took the northern bridge.  Charlie Company then 
contacted the Battalion Commander (located with the Forward Command Post) and 
notified him of their position.  A brief termination of enemy fire ensued.  However, 
Charlie Company started to, once again, take heavy enemy fire.  At the same time, the 
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Forward Air Controller (FAC) located with Bravo Company requested Close Air Support 
(CAS) to combat enemy forces attacking their position. 
Two A-10 aircraft engaged the targets north of the canal.  The A-10s arrived in 
the area and spotted damaged vehicles.  The A-10 pilots, unfamiliar with Marine Corps 
vehicle silhouettes, erroneously reported the vehicles as enemy vehicles. In actuality, 
these damaged vehicles came from Charlie Company.  The A-10s reported the sighting of 
these vehicles to the FAC who mistakenly verified the vehicles as the correct target.  The 
FACs erroneous verification resulted from observing smoke in the general area of the 
target.  The FAC never actually saw target or the A-10s.  Bravo Company, unable to 
verify other friendly force position, believed itself to be the lead element.  This erroneous 
belief led them to conclude only hostile forces lay in front of them.  The A-10 pilots 
received an erroneous report from the FAC stating no friendlies lay north of the southern 
bridge and gave the pilots clearance to engage.  Due to the FAC’s loss of Situational 
Awareness (SA) and misidentification of friendly forces as hostile, ten Marines died and 
four others were wounded.8   
Numerous factors contributed to the loss of SA by the FAC.  A few of these 
factors include the unplanned deviation from the planned scheme of maneuver, 
communication problems, and the actual hostile environment.  The FAC also deviated 
from the Battalion Commander’s standing orders on engagement with CAS.  Specifically, 
the FAC utilizes three types of control when directing aircraft to engage.  Type 1 is the 
default and means the FAC has “eyes on” the target.  Type 2 control occurs when the 
FAC may not have an actual visual of the target but has a secondary visual through a 
UAV or some other means.  Type 3 control is utilized when there is deemed a very low 
risk of fratricide, e.g., everything north of grid 20 is a target.  Standing orders limited 
Type 3 control solely to the Battalion Commander.  Therefore, the FAC utilized Type 3 
control in violation of standing orders. 
                                                 
8 “Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 2003.” 
Globalsecurity.org. 29 March 2004 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/11/mil-
021108-centcom01.htm. Accessed January 2008. 
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While the events leading to this tragic event appeared after careful analysis, what 
role did NCW play?  This case presents a perfect example of how the fog of war and the 
threat of death can cause rash decisions to be made in the absence of critical information.  
Suppose a system existed that could provide real time information to the FAC or the 
pilots informing them of current friendly force position.  Inserted correctly, Information 
Technology (IT) could have notified the FAC via some means that unit positions had 
changed. The pre-planned scheme of maneuver may have led the FAC to doubt the IT-
provided updated positional data, but these data may have led him to refrain from calling 
in CAS on a position potentially containing friendly forces.  This example also illustrates 
the difficulty in working in a joint environment.  The Air Force pilots did not recognize 
the Marines’ vehicles.  If we take this example and amplify it, how would those same Air 
Force pilots be able to recognize coalition vehicles when they could not identify vehicles 
from their own armed forces?  In this supposed NCW environment, these questions 
become critical. 
The proposed DoD answer, the GIG, seeks to link myriad data sources with 
common XML tags each with an agreed upon definition.  So how will this “pie in the 
sky” vision help the warfighter now?  The answer, it won’t.  In fact, some troops on the 
ground view NCW as a buzzword.  As a buzzword, NCW has no meaning.  Worse yet, 
NCW may become viewed as a concept draining resources away from more valuable 
assets like people and equipment upgrades.  In this one example from Iraq we see a 21st 
Century force still primarily utilizing basic communications technology, i.e. the radio, 
which has existed for generations.  In short, while the DoD focuses on an enterprise-wide 
approach to technology adoption, the warfighter on the ground has become an 
afterthought.  Technology should be adopted with the warfighter first and foremost in the 
minds of the DoD leadership.  Actual practice has revealed this not to be the case. 
a. Challenges 
The various services must overcome parochial interests in order to adopt 
technology which unites force sensor and data information in order to increase 
battlespace effectiveness and increase capabilities.  There will be resistance at all levels 
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as the services fall back on age-old suspicion and a parochial approach to war fighting.   
Moreover, the adoption of new technology will challenge the old forms of traditional 
command and control as well as doctrine and training.  As DoD fuses sensor data and 
enables more real time force visibility, the inclination for high-ranking individuals to 
make decisions away from the battlefield must be resisted.  An example would be a 
General Officer who can now see the entire battlespace and issues his commanders intent 
(CI).  The battle ensues and conditions change.  The personnel charged with carrying out 
the CI respond to the dynamic situation on the battlefield.  The General, supposedly 
seeing the entire situation, must resist micro-managing the warfighters on the field and 
instead focus on the overarching battle scenario. 
In addition to inter-service rivalry and the potential for commanders to 
micro-manage the battlespace, a need exists for joint thinking.  The JFCOM calls this 
“thinking purple.”  However, even if the cultural issues can be overcome and everyone 
starts “thinking purple” fusing disparate sensor information to deliver new and better 
capabilities in the battlespace quickly will continue to be a difficult challenge.  If the 
vision of uniting this information can be achieved, how does the warfighter take full 
advantage of it?  The scenario at An Nasiriyah serves as a good example.  What 
information exists and how do you get required information to the warfighter when 
needed?  The FAC required updated positional data on friendly and opposition forces in 
order to make a better decision on when and what to engage.  How can a robust GIG 
provide this information to the warfighter?  In its current iteration the GIG will not 
provide such required information in a timely fashion.  However, there must be a way to 
implement technology in a way that provides a true increase in capabilities, sooner rather 
than later. 
Utilization of limited bandwidth poses another problem that requires our 
attention.  Stories in the media report Special Forces troops calling in air strikes with 
laser pointers.  These stories seek to illustrate just how net centric the military has 
become.  However, behind the scenes, “commanders had to queue up for the satellite 
uplinks and bickering broke out over who would get access to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
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(UAVs).”9  More recently, in November of 2007, the Army and the Air Force have 
squabbled over which service will organize UAV assets.  Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, 
deputy chief of staff for Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), currently 
heading up the ISR Concept of Operations (CONOPS) effort for the Air Force, stated: 
“we need to bring some unity to all ISR pieces for the combatant commanders 
(COCOMS).”10  Again, the problem with interservice rivalry rears its ugly head.   
Bandwidth management, as a common problem among all services, will 
only continue to increase.  If the GIG does indeed become successful allowing all 
pertinent information to become available in the info-space, how does the warfighter 
obtain what he needs when he needs it?  When this large amount of information becomes 
available, the impact on bandwidth usage will be extreme.  However, the GIG offers no 
real solution to bandwidth management.  An alternative approach exists – adopt 
technology from the ground up centered on critical missions which will have an 
immediate impact.  Deliver information smartly by providing only what the warfighter 
needs, when he needs it.  Instead of insisting the warfighter pull information, have 
technology push information.  The seminal works of Professor Hayes-Roth at the Naval 
Postgraduate School address this concept by developing the idea of Valued Information 
at the Right Time (VIRT).  This approach presents an alternative and better way forward.  
                                                 
9 The Network is the Battlefield, Business Week Online, January 7, 2003. 
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II.  THE ALTERNATIVE 
A. VIRT – VALUED INFORMATION AT THE RIGHT TIME 
In the world envisioned by the GIG, all sensor information would be tagged in 
some meta-data model to allow for ease of access.  Okay, great.  Now what?  Do we then 
develop a user interface much like Google on steroids in order to allow for quick access 
and delivery of that information?  In other words, do we leave it to the warfighter to find 
what data may exist and how best to interface with it?  If we go this route, how do we 
address the time value of information?  How do we ensure a correct decision derives 
from timely and proper information? All these questions remain unanswered or 
postponed by the GIG.  In fact, there exists an assumption that once everyone’s sensor 
information becomes linked and given appropriate information tags, DoD will then be 
net-centric and better decisions will automatically follow.  This incorrect and dangerous 
assumption belies the fact that too much information (often termed info-glut) can be 
equally deadly as too little information.  So the question begs: How do you manage 
information smartly?  The answer:  VIRT.   
VIRT acknowledges from the outset that while you cannot possibly know 
everything an individual may want or require, you do have a general idea of some things 
the individual will definitely want.  A perfect example would be the Commanders Critical 
Information Requirements (CCIRs).  The Commander lays down general orders to follow 
and if any significant delta occurs, he will be alerted so he can consider any new 
information or changing situation to formulate a new decision.  VIRT utilizes technology 
in an automated way to do much the same thing.11  An individual may make a plan based 
on certain assumptions, termed Conditions of Interest (COIs), if any of these COIs 
change, the plan may need modification.  Technology, i.e. a Condition Monitor (CM) can 
be employed to monitor these assumptions in an automated fashion.  The CM can be 
employed to monitor a myriad set of sensor information feeds, e.g., Blue Force Tracker.  
                                                 
11 Rick Hayes-Roth, “Model Based Communication Networks and VIRT: Orders of Magnitude Better 
for Information Superiority,” 2006. 
 14
This linking of sensor information means the condition monitor will continually check for 
any significant event, alerting the individual should one be found. This continuous query 
ability refers to a state-full approach where the system maintains and updates constantly 
the state or condition of each query.  The entity will no longer need to complete a new 
query just to seek updated information.  The system knows what the entity would like and 
continuously queries the available data for him.  Figure 1 shows a simplistic view of this 
concept.  The Dependency Monitor included in Figure 1 shows the interplay between a 
plan’s assumptions and the information registry.  This monitor, referred to earlier as a 




Figure 1.   A simplified architecture for VIRT. (From: Hayes-Roth, 2006) 
This VIRT methodology has, as its base, the idea that only some information has 
high value.  The value of information delivered can be maximized by allowing 
technology to monitor conditions and only inform the individual when something of 
value has occurred.  The individual may have a particular plan in mind.  He can inform 
the system of this plan and let the system know what conditions to monitor that may have 
an impact on the plan.  Instead of the individual having to repeatedly query the system to 
discover if any of his assumptions has changed, the Dependency Monitor now monitors 
these conditions for him.  If any of the assumptions change, the alert goes out to the 
individual allowing the plan to be adjusted or cancelled.  Professor Hayes-Roth has 
explicitly compared two alternative and idealized approaches to disseminating 
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information, which he termed Theories 1 and 2.  In theory 1, each user pulls relevant data 
by periodically querying currently available data.  In Theory 2, each user relies on a 
dependency monitor to continually scan for events of interest.    VIRT, based on theory 2, 
seems clearly preferable in many situations. 
1. Theory I: Google on Steroids 
The first theory mirrors the current DoD approach of the GIG, namely, put the 
information out there and provide excellent query tools to pull the information down.  
This type of thinking stems from the belief that simply uniting information and having it 
available will engender information superiority.  The events of September 11, 2001 may 
have led to this belief.  Consider the example of Zacarias Maussaoui taking flight lessons 
in Minneapolis, Minnesota prior to September 11, 2001.  The flight instructor became 
suspicious when Maussaoui showed no interest in learning to land the plane.  The flight 
instructor notified the local FBI field office.  The field office arrested Maussaoui in 
August of 2001 on immigration charges.  This information, combined with other 
intelligence, may have thwarted the attacks of 9-11.12  However, the need for this type 
connection did not occur until after the attacks. 
After the attacks, many thought better decisions could result if a search ability 
existed across myriad agencies for similar information or intelligence.  Thus the impetus 
grew to create a way that would make sense of all the information available and provide a 
way to access that information.  The DoD pursued this approach by developing the GIG 
where all information would be tagged and therefore available to be pulled by anyone, 
from anywhere at anytime.  Professor Hayes-Roth terms this “smart-pull.”  This approach 
to networking assumes the individual needs to know information from a variety of 
sources and has the capabilities to query the system to obtain such information.  If all 
disparate source data could be linked, the individual would only need a great search tool 
like Google to search out necessary information.  Of course, this tool would need extreme 
robustness and responsiveness, becoming a “Google on steroids.” 
                                                 
12 Newsmax.com. Congressman: FBI Ignored Repeated Warnings by Phil Brennan. December 24, 
2001.  Accessed January 2008. 
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This methodology can be termed state-less in that the information technology has 
no knowledge of what information may be required by the user or already known by him.  
The user simply queries the system for required information, the system provides that 
information and the communication is closed.  This system does not maintain any 
knowledge of the “state” of the querying entity.  For instance, an entity may query about 
the existence of a nuclear capability in a target country.  The system initially reports, in 
our example, there is no known nuclear capability.  The entity requesting the information 
accepts the report and formulates plans based on this information.  However, shortly 
thereafter, the system may receive updated information that indicates the country in 
question does indeed have a nuclear capability.  The stateless system, forgetting previous 
interactions, does not notify the last querying entity to let that entity know the change in 
information.  The system simply updates its own database and leaves it to potential 
querying entities to discover it.  Therefore the earlier entity making a decision based on 
the absence of a nuclear capability may be formulating a plan based on incorrect data.  
The entity won’t know the information has changed unless it poses a new query to the 
system. 
2. Theory II: Smart Push Delivers Valued Info at the Right Time 
Theory II adopts the idea where “each processing entity can describe conditions 
that would make its current plans undesirable, because those conditions would contradict 
assumptions needed to justify the choice of the affected plan.”13  With the increasing 
amounts of available information, technology must be utilized in a way to mitigate what 
humans experience as the “data glut”.14  It will not be sufficient for the DoD to 
concentrate on linking sensor data and publishing relevant information.  The impetus 
must be on delivering information when and where necessary without placing the burden 
on the warfighter to “pull” required information or even to know the origin of the 
information.  This becomes a critical concept.  Information technology should be 
                                                 
13 Two Theories of Process Design for Information Superiority: Smart Pull vs. Smart Push. Rick 
Hayes-Roth, October 2005,  4. Available at http:// 
www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/010.pdf. 
14 Ibid., 6 
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employed to bring the biggest bang for the buck to the warfighter as quickly as possible.  
Warfighters shouldn’t need to be search and query experts.  Warfighters want to utilize 
technology to manage information smartly and push pertinent changes about their 
assumed situations that may affect mission outcome. 
This type of information management translates to a mission-specific application 
where the entity would specify certain conditions that, if negated, would warrant 
immediate notification.  This is much like the CCIRs discussed earlier.  Professor Hayes-
Roth terms these Conditions of Interest (COIs). The “information network is tasked to 
monitor these COIs and to alert the operator immediately when one is detected.”15 
3. VIRT: Simple Model Comparison 
The simple models provided by Professor Hayes-Roth best clarify the differences 
between the two theories.  Figures 2 and 3 below show the ideas of stateless and state-full 
processing, respectively.  The two models may appear similar at first glance, but the 
fundamental way each approaches information delivery differs radically.   
 
Figure 2.   Theory I Model (From: Hayes-Roth, 2005) 
By following the flow from left to right in Figure 2, it can be seen that the 
production of v or valued products flows from the Processing Entities (PEs) which do the 
actual work.  These PEs query (q) the Query Specifier (QS) which, in turn, passes via 
transaction p to the Query Planner (QP).  The QP utilizes any number of Information 
                                                 
15Two Theories of Process Design for Information Superiority: Smart Pull vs. Smart Push. Rick 
Hayes-Roth, October 2005, 4. Available at 
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/010.pdf 
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Directories (IDs) to discover what information may be available and how to access that 
information via process s.  The Information Stores (IS) “…store, manage and access 
discrete bodies of information.”16  The relevant information flows back through the chain 
and is ultimately transformed into a valued product.  Once the information reaches the 
PE, the query ceases and no further information is provided unless the PE provides a new 
query.  Making a query in this state-less environment involves an apparent cheap use of 
bandwidth.  The entity submits a query and the result is returned.  The simplicity of 
approach and apparent low cost communication makes this approach attractive.   
 
Figure 3.   Theory II Model (From: Hayes-Roth, 2005) 
The second model does not simply revise the first model with new letters.  This 
model shows VIRT in action.  Each PE specifies its informational requirement conditions 
c to the Condition Specifier (CS).  These conditions are relayed to the Condition Monitor 
(CM) via transactions w.  The CM accepts these conditions and discovers through the IDs 
and ISs what information is available and how to access it.  If a change occurs in the data 
matching the conditions specified, the CM will report these events back to the PE through 
the CS which in turn produces the valued product.  The main idea revolves around the 
constant state-full approach of the CM.  The CM monitors all available informational 
resources continuously and reports back any changed data corresponding to events 
matching the specified conditions. 
Clearly the use of a CM poses the great potential of decreasing bandwidth 
resources by providing only the information deemed valuable by the PE.  This approach 
                                                 
16 Rick Hayes-Roth, “Two Theories of Process Design for Information Superiority: Smart Pull vs. 
Smart Push,” October 2005, 7. 
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also relieves the PE of constantly forming new queries each and every time the PE would 
like an information update.  These conditions can be translated well into the vernacular 
relevant to the PE.  VIRT conforms well to current operations because the language 
utilized to define COIs may be based on the vocabulary of the operators themselves.  
Therefore, the operators do not need to learn a new language to interact with the system, 
they simply set up their COIs using a vocabulary familiar to them.  The state-full COIs 
continuously monitor these identified conditions via brokers or agents and report any 
relevant change.  If applied successfully, the operator would not need to waste time 
digesting immaterial routine data, e.g., insignificant weather updates.  On the other hand, 
if the weather changes in a way that can significantly affect the mission, the system will 
alert him.  Just in Time (JIT) inventory practices compare well to the smart delivery of 
information.  Both concentrate on the delivery of only those items deemed necessary or 
valuable.  
B.  SUPPLY CHAIN – A SIMILAR APPROACH 
The world has witnessed numerous innovations within the commercial sector 
involving inventory management.  The concept of Just-in-Time (JIT) has caught on and 
offers a great solution to the problem of too much inventory leading to the large costs 
associated with storage.  The relevance of the delivery of products or raw material 
compares well to the smart delivery of information.  JIT relies on physical inventory 
control queues referred to by the Japanese name of kanban to signal the need to move 
raw materials from a previous process to a new one.  There exists a great similarity 
between JIT and the VIRT concept of continuous query for new significant events. 
Where one moves valuable molecules, the other moves valued bits. The CM continuously 
queries the system and if one of its conditions has changed, a signal will notify the PE of 
a change in identified conditions. 
Suppliers of raw materials interface closely with their customers to implement 
kanban systems that provide instant notification of a requirement so the supplier can 
fulfill a need.  This customer-supplier interface seeks to reduce or eliminate waste or 
what the Japanese call muda from their system.  Lean systems employed by companies 
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all over the world focus on the elimination of this muda.  By focusing on the elimination 
of waste, the supplier can avoid costly over-production, unnecessary work in process 
(WIP) and unnecessary inventory.  Lean systems fit well the current effort within DoD to 
find a way to better manage the limited bandwidth available in an operational 
environment.  The ever-increasing amount of information has made proper bandwidth 
management of increasing concern.  A great deal of current research focuses on 
increasing bandwidth on the battlefield.  However, research concentrating on better ways 
to manage current available bandwidth lag.  VIRT offers a solution.  The use of available 
bandwidth can be significantly reduced if only information deemed valuable is delivered.  
Instead of the current approach of delivering a COP to every user, a better concept would 
be a User Defined Operating Picture (UDOP) supplied by VIRT smart push. In this 
UDOP, COIs are identified and when bandwidth becomes limited, only pertinent, valued 
information would be delivered. 
The production environment does not want to waste resources manufacturing 
products that will not be used or shipping raw materials which will sit idly in a 
warehouse.  That environment wishes to ship only products or raw materials of 
immediate use.  This focus on shipping value aligns well with the VIRT idea of utilizing 
bandwidth to only ship information (bits) deemed valuable.  VIRT poses the question, 
“Why waste valuable resources shipping redundant or unimportant information if we can 
avoid it?”   Moreover, the human operator can only effectively process limited amounts 
of information.  Deluging a human with too much information may lead to paralysis or, at 
the very least, much slower decisions.  Technology can be utilized to actively monitor 
sensor and other information sources to glean value and deliver information to the human 
when and where needed.  This information will not only be what the human wants 
exactly, it will also be the most up to date and relevant information the system has to 
offer.  Thus, instead of information withering on the vine it will be selectively plucked 
and effectively consumed. 
While not addressing VIRT per se, some efforts in DoD provide a potential basis 
for rapidly launching VIRT.  In particular, we want to consider efforts within DoD that  
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focus on machine-to-machine communication.  One of these, called Cursor on Target 
(CoT), highlights a central focus on delivering necessary information, e.g., sensor data, 
where and when required. 
C. CURSOR ON TARGET 
Cursor on Target attempts to solve the problem of interoperability by focusing on 
replacing the “human voice and physical interface needed when combat controllers in the 
field transmit targeting data.”17  Replacing the human in the loop with Machine to 
Machine (M2M) communication will reduce lag time and human-induced error.  The 
ultimate goal will “allow all the necessary information and tasking orders to flow to the 
target as needed when command center personnel literally put their computer cursor over 
the target.”18   The idea of putting a cursor over a target and having all the information 
flow comes from the mind of Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper who, in a 
2003 conference, stated “we've got to learn to think in terms of integration so that the 
sum of the systems all put together between air, land, sea and space, ends up with a 
cursor over the target.”19  
The Air Force Materiel Commands (AFMC) Electronic Systems Center (ESC) 
took General Jumper’s challenge to heart and selected MITRE Corporation to lead the 
effort.  This eventually led to the production of several prototype activities with more 
than 40 different systems throughout the military.  They utilized the commercial viability 
of XML but not in a top-down way.  They used XML as an enabler focusing on the what, 
where and when.  The CoT effort has led to M2M targeting to: 
                                                 
17 Cursor on Target information technology online, by William Miller. Article published September 2, 
2004, Volume 8 Issue 7. http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=596 
Accessed February 2008. 
18Cursor on Target information technology online, by William Miller. Article published September 02, 
2004, Volume 8 Issue 7. http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=596 
Accessed February 2008. 
19 Space Architecture and Integration – Challenges for the Future – Transcript. Speech to the 19th 
National Space Symposium, Colorado Springs, Colo., April 10, 2003. Available at bnet.com 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PDU/is_2003_April_10/ai_109569811 Accessed February 2008. 
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• provide special forces the ability to click on a laser rangefinder 
designating a hostile target, 
• pass precision coordinates, 
• send mensurated target coordinates to an airborne asset, and 
• download these directly into a GPS-guided munition.20 
This M2M linking may benefit from an additional insertion of the human as a 
producer and consumer of linked information.  This new prosumer would be able to link 
into the M2M world to gain valuable sensor data.  A VIRT type technology could be 
inserted to monitor information in accordance with COIs and deliver valued information 
to the human.  The Air Force may think future warfare will evolve into a simple 
computer game played by personnel stationed in the United States.  This idea may indeed 
prove true in the future, but the here and now leaves little doubt that the warfighter on the 
ground will continue to remain at the tip of spear.  This warrior can well benefit from 
such technology today.  Why wait years when we can implement a system to fuse myriad 
M2M sensor information and filter such information in a humanly usable way?  The 
answer: we shouldn’t. 
The fusing of machines into a viable shared awareness cannot leave the frontline 
warrior out of the picture.  The warrior on the ground can benefit more from sensor 
information in the formulation of tactics and actual mission planning than anyone.  VIRT 
concepts would allow this warrior to identify information important to him and choose 
how to be alerted if any of the assumptions in his world view should change in a pre-
defined, significant way.  Coupling VIRT with a CoT capability shows a great deal of 
promise in delivering this type of capability within a few months instead of a few 
decades. 
The effectiveness of the VIRT concept can be best illustrated when applied to a 
typical mission.  As illustrated earlier in this paper, the CAS mission holds a great deal of 
promise for technology insertion.  The goals of CAS seek to concentrate air assets to 
                                                 
20 Mitre Corporation, “Cursor on Target Narrative” (Bedford, Massachusetts: 2007, photocopied), 1.  
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destroy enemy positions while minimizing or avoiding fratricide and civilian casualties.  
The incident at An Nasiriyah illustrates an example of the real risk of fratricide in 
maneuver warfare.  The JFCOM has adopted the idea of a Joint Terminal Attack 
Controller (JTAC) who can control the air assets of any service.  The JTAC extends the 
Marine and Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC) concept.  Analyzing the current 
process of information delivery or the “as-is” and comparing it to Theory II, or Smart 
Push, will help identify the strengths and weaknesses of each.  A brief overview of the 
JTAC mission follows. 
D. THE APPLICATION: JOINT TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLER 
Joint Publication 1-02 defines a JTAC as: 
A qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, 
directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other 
offensive air operations. A qualified and current JTAC will be recognized 
across the Department of Defense as capable and authorized to perform 
terminal attack control. 
This amounts to a sort of “driver’s license” or credentialization for the ground-
based FACs from all services.  This definition disguises the true difficulty in 
accomplishing such a daunting mission.  “The job of the JTAC includes control, de-
confliction, respecting availability times, clearing aircraft off to tankers, and so forth.”21  
This type of control applies to all service aircraft.  This JTAC mission seems a perfect 
case for the incorporation of inter-service sensor fusion and VIRT concepts.  Already the 
importance of the JTAC mission has proven important enough for the respective services 
to accept a common, joint training and evaluation standard that applies across the 
components.22   
The importance of this mission reflects the great amount of effort taken to link the 
services to form a common training environment.  The reason for this focus stems from 
                                                 
21 Rebecca Grant, “Bombs on Target,”  Airforce Magazine Online Volume 88, No. 8 (August 2005). 
Available at < http://www.afa.org/magazine/aug2005/0805target.asp>. Accessed January 2008. 
22 Robert G. Armfield, JTAC: Separating Fact from Fiction (Alabama: Air Command and Staff 
College Air University, 2003), 7. 
 24
the extreme desire to avoid fratricide and enable air controllers from the various services 
to control all air assets as needed.  The need for a JTAC came partly out of Operation 
ALLIED FORCE when in the summer of 2000, Air Force combat controllers had their 
qualification as TACs questioned.  This led the Air Force to seek an acceptable joint 
qualification which would be accepted by all the services.  After Operation 
ANACONDA, the Army showed great interest in the JTAC concept.  Conducted in 
March of 2002, operation ANACONDA showed the U.S. Army ground forces working 
closely with several allies and their sister services.  Operation ANACONDA revealed a 
need to de-conflict air space and provide coordinated air control.  The Army subsequently 
saw a need for up to 1000 JTACs.  This led to the November 2002 effort by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to establish a Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Executive Steering 
Committee.  A common training standard and qualification for JTACs, outlined in Joint 
Publication 3-09, resulted.  It should be re-emphasized here that this important change 
occurred from the ground or bottom up.  The warriors on the ground saw the need where 
those above did not.  Once they identified the need of CAS coordination, they began 
searching for a solution. 
Introduced and adopted quickly, the JTAC concept reflected the urgent need for 
this type of qualified individual.  However, the services cannot fall into the trap of 
creating a whole battalion of JTACs with a belief that this alone will resolve the issue of 
fratricide and enable better unity of force.  Indeed, this effort may very well have the 
opposite effect.  If numerous JTACs take to the field, there exists the real possibility of 
multiple kinetic responses to the same target.  For example, if two JTACs operating in 
adjacent areas hear a radio call from an isolated force to render CAS, each of these 
JTACs may independently begin coordinating fire with their assigned assets on the 
necessary position when one engagement would suffice.  Therefore, the JTAC in charge 
of overall operational deconfliction will have a much harder job in airspace deconfliction 
and target acquisition.  This wastes manpower and ammunition and increases the 
possibility of fratricide.  As the number of certified JTACs increase, the DoD must look 
for better ways to coordinate their activities.  Obviously voice alone will not suffice.  If  
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the number of JTACs increase without a better use of technology to facilitate clear 
communications, an already overburdened voice communications infrastructure may 
become useless.   
As shown by the quickly adopted JTAC concept, the warriors on the frontline will 
not wait for direction from above to make things happen.  The ethos of the warrior leads 
him to demand solutions to existing problems now.  This presents a perfect opportunity to 
introduce the concept of VIRT fused with a CoT technology linking sensor data in order 
to provide better SA with intelligent signaling to decrease bandwidth usage while 
increasing unity of force.  
The JTAC role in planned and emergency on-call CAS may involve a great deal 
of different scenarios.  Chapter III of this thesis illustrates a scenario a JTAC may well 
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III. THE SCENARIO 
A. JTAC OPERATIONAL SCENARIO 
1. The Model 
While no “typical” JTAC scenario exists in the operational environment, the 
following scenario serves as a realistic example.  The mission below flows from planning 
through execution.  The basis of the scenario revolves around the USMC experience.  In 
the operational environment, the Maneuvering Commanding Officer (CO) owns the 
operational environment in which the JTAC operates.  The CO will generate an order that 
turns into a local order tasking a unit the JTAC belongs to.  The exemplar task: destroy a 
house containing opposition forces (OPFOR).  This explosion will signal other friendly 
forces to commence ingress into a northern position.   
The JTAC will evaluate the mission and determine what assets he requires to 
neutralize the target.  The JTAC also needs to know the placement of pre-existing kinetic 
assets.  Assets in place may include mortars and artillery that could be planned into the 
mission.  The JTAC will plot the location of all indirect fire assets so he can ensure 
airspace de-confliction.  This pre-planning may include allowance for Naval Surface Fire 
Support (NSFS) assets located offshore or artillery batteries.  For this example, the JTAC 
decides an F-18 loaded with a 500 lb bomb will suffice to neutralize the target while 
negating the possibility of fratricide.  His assigned area encompasses roughly 2 sq km 
and involves land, air and temporal conditions.  Once the JTAC determines the assets 
necessary to fulfill the mission task, he submits his requirements up the air chain of 
command in the form of a JTAR (Joint Tactical Air Request).  A pre-planned mission is 
normally submitted 96 hours prior to mission date.  Those requests submitted less than 96 
hours, termed immediate requests, should be sufficiently important to justify the shuffling 
of assets.  For instance, immediate requests can be submitted for a “right now” situation, 
in which case a section in the air or on the flight line can be re-tasked from their assigned 
mission to support the JTAC’s more vital mission.  This request is filtered and 
subsequently included in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) – often taking 24 hours or more to 
generate. 
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Once the ATO comes out, the JTAC discovers whether the requested assets have 
been approved and if not, what assigned assets he has to work with.  This may require a 
modification of the JTAC’s plan.  For instance maybe one potential delivery platform, the 
AC-130H, is unavailable for the time of the planned attack, but an F-18 is available.  Or 
the available ordnance may not include the preferred 500 lb bomb.  In this scenario, we’ll 
assume the requested assets (a 500 lb bomb and precision delivery via F-18) remain 
available and assigned. 
The JTAC and his team detach to the Observation Position (OP).  From this 
vantage they may put eyes on the target.  The F-18 checks in with the JTAC who then 
assumes control.  The initial exchange between the pilot and the JTAC most often 
involves a brief summary by the JTAC to bring the pilot up to speed on the ground 
situation and to ensure both pilot and JTAC perceive the same target. This initial 
exchange will also include aircraft call sign, type, ordnance available, time on station 
(TOS), and current position (including the assigned airspace or “chunk of sky” that the 
aircraft is allowed in). This may include requesting the pilot to make use of his targeting 
pod (if the aircraft is equipped) to put eyes on the target.  If the JTAC is carrying a Rover 
ground station, he can look at the video feed to ensure the pilot is, indeed, targeting the 
correct position.  While not always the case, a Rover partnered with a targeting pod 
provides the JTAC a great deal of comfort because he knows with almost absolute 
certainty the target is correct because he sees exactly what the pilot sees.   
2. Basic Mission 
Intelligence reports a particular house contains terrorists.  The area commander 
orders a daytime assault on the house and surrounding community.  The attack shall rally 
a larger assault on the area.  Assigned to loiter in the area, a UAV Scan Eagle will remain 
at an altitude of 5000 feet.  The JTAC must track the position of this asset.  A Rover will 
deliver the video feed to the JTAC.  The JTAC can only view one feed at a time but the 
HQ can watch any number of feeds and reports by voice to the field JTAC. 
The success of the mission shall be determined by a Battle Damage Assessment 
(BDA) conducted by the JTAC.  The F-18 reports on station and information is relayed to 
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the pilot.  The target house is confirmed by the targeting pod.  The F-18 drops its 
ordnance and egresses out of the area via pre-planned route.  The bombardment of the 
house initiates friendly troop movement north.  Subsequently, the Scan Eagle reports 
video to HQ of a truck moving at high speed toward the JTAC’s area.  Intel reports this 
vehicle contains terrorists retreating from a nearby operational area engagement.  HQ 
orders the JTAC to engage and destroy the fleeing truck.   
Unit Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) states a UAV can provide the JTAC 
Type II control.  Since the JTAC does not have a visual, he declares Type II control with 
the AC-130 Gunship asset.  At the same time the JTAC spots an unanticipated UH-60Q 
Medical Evacuation (medevac) helicopter (helo) transiting through the area.  This 
unanticipated air movement causes him to cancel the truck engagement with the AC-130.  
The AC-130 can no longer remain on station and returns to base (RTB) due to bingo fuel 
(only enough fuel to return to base).  Once the helo clears the area, the AC-130 asset has 
moved out of the area and the JTAC requests another asset through his air officer at HQ.  
The Air Officer has anticipated the bingo fuel and the resultant request and has a nearby 
Cobra directed to support the JTAC.  The JTAC utilizes the UAV asset under Type II 
control to track the target and talk the pilot to it.   The Cobra engages the moving truck 
and destroys it.  UAV loitering provides BDA indicating the initial target and truck target 
destroyed.  Blue Forces continue movement North into another AOR.   JTAC stays in 
current AOR. 
The JTAC has a complex task.  He must monitor and track all air assets within his 
AOR as well as the location of other types of fire whether on the ground or at sea.  He 
must also monitor the location of friendly forces as well as the location of the bad guys.  
The situation on the ground constantly evolves.  Tracking all of this information taxes the 
JTAC and increases the potential for mistakes.23 
                                                 
23 Capt. Byron Harder, USMC of Monterey, interview by author, 27 November 2007, Monterey, 
personal notes, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
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3. Phases of JTAC Engagement 
The ability of the JTAC to call off the aircraft from a bombing run will depend on 
the current aircraft phase of attack.  The five phases include: 
1. Phase 1 – Check-in: Aircraft holding on station and JTAC delivers 9-line 
report.  This report contains the initial point/battle position, heading, 
distance, target elevation, target description, target location, type mark, 
location of friendlies, and egress.24 
2. Phase II – Preparation:  This phase occurs between the 9-line report and 
the actual commencement of the attack run.  Usually 1 – 2 minutes elapse 
before time on target (TOT). 
3. Phase III – Attack Inbound Phase:  Aircraft departs the check in point and 
arrives at the initial point (IP). 
4. Phase IV – Attack Phase:  This begins at the IP and continues until the 
target has been prosecuted.  The JTAC will hear an “IP Inbound” report 
from the pilot.  The pilot will be waiting for the JTAC to report “cleared 
hot.”  If the pilot does not receive a “cleared hot” report, the pilot will 
report “wings level.”  If a “cleared hot” report is still not received, the 
pilot will vector off and report his call sign and “no drop.” 
5. Phase V – Egress Phase:  Aircraft headed back to Control Point (CP).25 
4. Possible COIs 
Weapons status and aircraft ordnance carried suggest a few of the several 
instances a condition monitor (CM) could usefully track.  A case could exist where the 
JTAC anticipates the use of a 500 lb bomb.  When the pilot checks in, he might report to 
the JTAC the unavailability of any 500 lb bombs.  As a result, the aircraft carries a 1,000 
lb bomb as replacement.  In its anticipated application, the JTAC could realize that the 
damage radius of the 1000 lb bomb would make fratricide unavoidable.  Thus, the JTAC 
realizes the available ordnance cannot be utilized in this situation.  This may be a go/no-
go decision.  Wouldn’t it be nice if the JTAC knew earlier that the aircraft assigned to 
him is not carrying the ordnance he thinks essential?  Shouldn’t he be informed before 
                                                 
24 JFIRE Multi Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Fire Power, October 2004 
25 Capt Byron Harder, USMC.  Interview conducted 13 February 2008.  These are not official phases, 
but general categories of aircraft engagement as perceived by Capt Harder. 
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the aircraft takes off instead of when the aircraft arrives and checks in with him?  This 
type of event could be monitored for him, and alerting him to the event would deliver 
high value in a timely way.   
Another opportunity for detecting events would result from monitoring the 
surrounding area.  Any unexpected traffic reported moving towards his area should 
initiate an alert.  This could be done via automated means instead of requiring constant 
human-in-the-loop radio feed as now done.  COI examples include: 
• Unanticipated medevac aircraft appears in AOR.  Need to know in order 
to avoid potential fratricide and airspace conflict. 
• Blue force movement not as briefed in the pre-planned scheme of 
maneuver – any unanticipated change in location is forwarded. 
• New intelligence reports civilians in the area, which may mean mission 
no-go. 
• Fuel status of assigned assets (including replacement assets should bingo 
fuel require assigned assets to return to base.) 
These COIs can be generalized as shown in Table 1. 
 
COI Instance COI Generalized Pattern 
Unplanned medevac helo comes within 2km of 
any airborne gunships at any time during the 
medevac mission 
…at any time (t), 
distance(position(non_combatant(t)), 
position(gunship_combatant(t))  < safe threshold 
Assigned aircraft fuel requirements insufficient 
for mission completion (including  reserve) 
…at any time (t) remaining_resource(Res, Agent,Plan, 
Route,Position (t)) < 
resource_needed_to_complete(Res, Agent,Plan, 
Route, Position(t)) + safety_reserve (Res, Agent, Plan)
New intel reports unplanned civilians in AOR.  
If UAV asset confirms, send visual. 
…at any time (t), : non-combatant(nc).position(t) 
is_inside my.AOR(t) & visually_verified(nc, 
“Civilian,” UAV.camera.feed(position(t), t) 
Blue force position changes from planned 
scheme of maneuver. 
…at any time (t), distance (blue force position(t), 
(blueforce planned position(t)) > position-delta-
threshold 
Table 1.   COI Table 
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B. JTAC AS-IS: ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SCENARIO 
1. Assumptions 
Communications will remain intact for the entirety of the mission.  The 
interconnectivity of sensor information will be continuous.  The incoming medevac 
helicopter position will not be available until too late for diversion instructions.  The 
medevac mission takes priority over the JTACs mission.   
2. Limitations 
This scenario involves a limited set of interactive assets. This constriction of 
assets and scope of the scenario results from the limited amount of sensor information 
that can be readily simulated in an academic environment.  This scenario will be used as 
the basis for an experiment combining limited sensor resources to provide a means of 
comparison between the current approach to information delivery and the Theory 2 or 
VIRT approach.  However, even though the scope of the experiment may be limited, the 
efficacy of the VIRT approach may still prove itself.  Therefore, the only items being 
continually monitored will be those items the system can currently link with via M2M 
interface.   
Since all assets in the scenario lack a common link and cannot share data 
automatically, e.g., fuel status, weapons payload, etc., the power of their union cannot be 
illustrated.  An example would be the power of uniting weapons payload data via 
automated interface with the aircraft data as soon as the aircraft lifts off.  This would 
update JTAC information and allow a change in plans, if necessary, prior to the aircraft 
arriving on station.  In a perfect world, all assets would have some level of an automated 
information generation capability and this information would feed various condition 
monitors throughout the battlespace. 
The informational load will be limited to the field level JTAC in this scenario.  
While it becomes apparent that the central JTAC may also be overloaded with 
information, that complexity is not addressed in this basic view.  However, application of 
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the VIRT concept can be expanded in the future to include the central JTAC as well as 
other humans in the loop such as the battalion commander (or the pilot).   
The JTAC’s main communication method revolves around a voice link over a 
UHF, VHF, and UHF Satcom PRC-117F radio.  Current position of forces may be 
available through BFT.  However, the JTAC receives positional updates as deemed 
necessary by a central JTAC located in a safe position coordinating the efforts of several 
JTACs in the field.  This coordination effort requires a great deal of mental effort to 
maintain real-time SA.  It cannot be assumed that all pertinent friendly force positional 
changes or updated sensor information will be relayed in a timely manner to personnel in 
the field.  The processing entity, in this case a human, has a limited cognitive ability to 
process large amounts of information.  
Some of the current information requirements of the field level JTAC include: 
• Position of friendly and opposition forces updated as they change.  This is 
especially important prior to CAS employment. 
• Planned times of mortar and NSFS fire as well as the vectors these fires 
will use and the ultimate target of each.  This is necessary to de-conflict 
airspace. 
• Maneuver boundaries. 
• The assigned altitude blocks for each aircraft. 
• The target assigned to each aircraft. 
• Actual location of each aircraft. 
• The ordnance located on each aircraft. 
• Unit boundaries (updated if they change) 
A myriad of sources may contain this information but the current JTAC has 
difficulty accessing them easily.  As a result, information gathering becomes burdensome 
and time consuming.  However, the JTAC considers this information critical to proper 
decision-making.  For example, the location of friendly forces concerns the JTAC 
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greatly.  He needs to know immediately if force positions change in any way that will 
affect his mission.  If troops move into his AOR and specifically into his current target 
location, these forces may become collateral damage.  Of near equal importance, the 
location of civilian non-combatants needs to be known as soon as possible.  If the JTAC 
engages a target and successfully destroys it but in the process kills several women and 
children, the otherwise successful operation turns into a failure.   
The ordnance an aircraft carries is of great importance and relates to the earlier 
point of fratricide and civilian casualties.  If an assigned aircraft expects to carry a 500 lb 
bomb but instead carries a 1000 lb bomb, the JTAC will need to reconsider whether the 
target can be engaged with the larger ordnance.  This consideration depends on whether 
the increase in kinetic force will impact the safety of nearby forces or neutral parties.  If 
the ordnance does not pair well with the target, the mission may be canceled.  If the 
JTAC does not find out this information until the aircraft checks in with him, he must 
scramble to locate other assets to divert to his mission.  Moreover, his mission may not be 
a high priority and will be cancelled.  This wastes resources.   
In the hypothetical scenario mentioned in this paper, the JTAC must receive 
information in a piecemeal fashion.  He creates a plan and submits this plan for 
acceptance into the ATO.  Once approved, he deploys to the OP and readies himself for 
the mission.  At least three radio operators accompany the JTAC.  He carries a great deal 
of weight and coordinates his efforts with numerous parties.  Since his main concern lies 
with the aircraft assigned to carry out his mission, he establishes contact with the pilot 
and relays any change in information and confirms the plan of attack.   
The amount of voice relay of information becomes quite large over time and the 
dynamically changing situation on the ground (and in the air) causes the JTAC to 
necessarily focus on the one mission at hand.  Sometimes, a pilot is so overwhelmed with 
chatter that he will turn down the radio when he is in the midst of a bombing run so he 
can focus better.  The bits of information in this as-is example do not represent the total 
amount of information the JTAC must process.  However, this example does hint at the 
deluge of information and how technology may not be helping him to the extent it could.  
The UAV video and the targeting pod video have become very useful tools allowing the 
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JTAC to engage a target better and with more clarity.  However, this simply represents 
new technology gathering and dissemination.  The human must still compile and analyze 
this information and make decisions quickly.  The types of information the UAV and 
targeting pods represent will increase in the future. Therefore, technology must be 
employed in such a way to make better sense of the deluge and still deliver valuable 
information when and where needed. 
C. VIRT VERSUS AS-IS JTAC SCENARIO: A VALUABLE COMPARISON 
The primary method the JTAC utilizes for information delivery relies heavily on 
voice communications.  Any updated information must be passed directly to the JTAC in 
the field via several voice channels.  The JTAC and two or three other radio personnel 
monitor these voice channels.  These personnel help the JTAC ensure he has an excellent 
overall situational awareness.  However, this over-reliance on voice technology causes a 
problem of excessive “chatter” limiting the amount of information passed.  Furthermore, 
there exists information in the battlespace not currently utilized that would significantly 
enhance the JTACs mission effectiveness.  This information includes the position of 
opposition forces, new intelligence reports of civilian positions, IED positional data 
reported from the field, fuel status of incoming aircraft, directional indicators of flight 
paths through the JTACs AOR, aircraft payloads, etc.  This dynamically changing 
information would greatly benefit the JTAC in the field. Prior to a specific mission a 
situation report (SITREP) may be analyzed that details much of this information.  
However, changes in this SITREP may not be reported to the JTAC once he has departed 
the HQ.  These changes may have a significant impact on mission success.  Therefore, 
the JTAC requires this new information in order to re-evaluate mission assumptions.  If 
these changes can be delivered in a real-time, non-burdensome way, the effectiveness of 
the JTAC can be greatly enhanced.  A few ways exist to accomplish the goal of smart 
information delivery.   
The current approach of radio-voice communications and human-in-the-loop 
information dissemination presents a base case.  This approach offers the benefit of a 
force structure currently in place familiar with this type of information delivery.  
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However, this approach also presents an exponential problem of scalability.  The amounts 
of available information will no doubt increase to a level not currently imaginable.  The 
archaic use of voice technology cannot possibly keep pace with this rapid increase.  
Furthermore, voice communications does not currently allow an automated system to 
check machine-originated information resources and deliver them smartly to the 
warfighter.  An example would be the monitoring of an aircraft’s fuel state.  Technology 
already exists that monitors aircraft fuel status.  The sooner the JTAC becomes aware that 
available fuel may not meet mission requirements the sooner he can alter the plan as 
necessary.  The current approach cannot harness this type of information delivery without 
hiring more soldiers to monitor fuel status and make aural reports.  The DoD 
acknowledges the significance of this information increase and offers a solution centered 
around the smart pull of information over the GIG.  This type of information pull will not 
be adequate. 
In the world envisioned by the GIG, warriors will subscribe to informational 
nodes, and information will then be forwarded to the warrior according to subscribed 
communities.  This approach places the impetus on the warrior to know what sources 
exist and constantly check the availability of any new information.  The system will 
allow the user to form a standing query but does not allow the type of precise 
specifications as a CM would address.  This unparsed information would require the 
warfighter to orient the information to the current situation.  While this approach offers 
some level of value, it does not address real mission-specific implementation of 
technology to allow the warrior on the ground to fully maximize available information. 
Currently, the JTAC has numerous tasks he must accomplish.  Maintaining 
situational awareness remains the primary task of the JTAC requiring much of his 
attention and concentration.  The JTAC must monitor the projected flight paths of all 
aircraft within his AOR and ensure there is no intersection.  He must monitor the position 
of friendly forces, opposition forces, civilians, bomb payloads, unplanned force 
movement, etc.  Moreover, he must coordinate with each aircraft as they approach their 
targets to ensure proper engagement.  Subsequently, he must conduct a BDA to ensure 
target destruction.  Battlespace knowledge includes monitoring of artillery naval surface 
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fire origination and destination.  In short, the JTAC must consider a great deal of 
information.  As a result, the smartest JTAC can become overwhelmed with the current 
load of information.  In the coming years, this information will only increase.  
Technology must be better employed to deliver information smartly otherwise the JTAC 
may become overwhelmed.  In short, without something that smartly reduces the volume 
of relevant information, the JTAC of tomorrow will risk paralysis by analysis. 
The increase in information coupled with bandwidth limitations presents a 
challenge to DoD.  If the DoD continues with the current approach to battlefield 
information management, the warfighter on the ground may find available bandwidth 
quickly overwhelmed.  If the GIG becomes a ubiquitous reality, there will be a great 
increase in users accessing all types of information from the field.  While the cost of each 
individual query may not be large, the aggregate total of all these new queries may 
overtax the IT infrastructure.  This could remain true even assuming a large growth in 
available bandwidth.  For example, the person making a query in the field may not know 
the exact information required.  He enters a query and the system returns numerous items 
which may be relevant.  This approach mirrors Google’s client-query response.  Now, 
imagine the warfighter wants a UAV video centered around his AOR.  First, he must 
enter a search.  The search may not find a UAV centered around his AOR; however there 
may be several feeds from nearby areas.  If the system returns these feeds, the 
infrastructure may function acceptably until such time as several other queries attempt to 
deliver video feed as well. 
Clearly, transforming warfighters into information query experts may not be the 
best solution, especially when these warriors find themselves in harm’s way.  Moreover, 
the resistance from the warfighter may be extreme.  These individuals do not want their 
lives made more difficult.  This type of technology implementation would undoubtedly 
become more burdensome because the onus of information gathering would be placed on 
the warriors’ shoulders.  Instead, information technology and the ever increasing power 
of computational capability should be harnessed to do much of this monitoring for the 
warrior and only deliver to him what is pertinent to his situation.  This smart IT filter in 
the form of VIRT will gather much more information from many more sources and boil it 
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down to usable pieces of timely information delivered to the warfighter when and where 
needed.  Additionally, since the IT system will filter the information according to the 
user’s input and the actual information filtering occurs as close as possible to the actual 
information source, the amount of bandwidth utilized to deliver this information 
decreases.  This decrease in bandwidth usage results from the IT system only utilizing 
enough bandwidth necessary to deliver pertinent changes.  Thus, the channels remain 
unclogged even with numerous users attempting to pull down information 
simultaneously.  Subsequently, information delivery only occurs when necessary. 
In a VIRT application, the operator or the Decision Support System (DSS) 
working on behalf of the operator, defines the required information.  Therefore, the 
JTAC, for example, will employ technology to filter information he deems important and 
determine the delivery method alerts will be sent.  The operator identifies COIs and loads 
them into the system.  Pre-loaded COIs can exist within the system based on a similar 
users previous experience.  This presents a powerful way to harness lessons learned and 
continuous improvement.  The beta version of this VIRT system may not have a robust 
set of COIs, so the user will probably need to refine them.  However, once entered, the 
system will retain these conditions and pre-load them the next time a similar user 
accesses the system.  Some of these COIs may not function well and might need to be 
modified.  A new JTAC in the field, for example, may not know exactly what he should 
ask the system to deliver.  Over time the system will have interacted with numerous 
JTACs and will possess a very good inventory of what a typical JTAC will need to know.  
The new JTAC will enter his area of operations and assigned aircraft.  The system will 
then be able to tell him what it will monitor and offer an opportunity to modify or add 
other COIs. This results in a more effective JTAC on day one of his tour. 
Theory II involves a more conceptual approach.  The “blackbox” containing a 
VIRT condition monitor will need to interface with current Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.  Moreover, several databases will need to be connected in 
order to store relevant data including assumed situational models addressing the key 
concerns in the warfighter’s view of the world.  This world-view situational model will 
be utilized to identified which valued information to deliver to the warrior in a real time 
 39
manner.  These information requirements delivered by the VIRT enabled system, provide 
a capability to not only deliver information deemed valuable to the user but also discard 
information with little or no value.  These valuable informational bits might include fuel 
levels of assigned aircraft, time on station of each aircraft, relay of video feed from 
multiple UAVs, etc.  Similar informational items referring to other AOR’s may exist but 
present little to no value for a JTAC not assigned that area.  
The incoming aircraft may be called off at anytime by the JTAC.  However, after 
the aircraft enters phase III, it becomes much more difficult.  If the medevac status were 
being monitored, and a CM employed, the CM could have monitored the positional COI 
and automatically notified the JTAC that a problem exists.  The JTAC thus calls off the 
AC-130 attack on the truck.  If the CM could monitor the fuel status of the AC-130, then 
the JTAC would know right away that the aircraft will not be able to stay on station to 
destroy the target.   
Once the CM detects a problem, the JTAC can move forward with an alternate 
plan.  This assumes that the sooner the JTAC knows of a change or problem with a plan, 
the sooner he can make appropriate changes and elicit a better outcome.  This allows the 
JTAC to have a much quicker decision cycle.  For example, if no aircraft exists that can 
fulfill the mission and the central JTAC must make a call, he can be notified of the 
condition early and he can then vector another aircraft off their main mission to engage 
the truck. 
All of these COIs must be input into the CM in some user friendly way.   This 
input mechanism must be easy for the user to interact with and must bring together 
available sensor data into a presentable way the user can make sense of.  Most individuals 
are familiar with Windows and the use of drop down menus.  Thus, implementing the 
familiar look and feel of a Windows-based system seems the easiest way to make this 
type of VIRT system most accessible.  While the actual application does not need to be a 
Windows product, the comfort level of users will increase if it mirrors some of the basic 
properties. Thus the actual implementation would be best served by a form of graphical 
user interface (GUI) with which the user can interact. 
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This interface will prompt the individual user to enter conditions to monitor.  
These conditions can be presented in the form of drop down menus based around 
dynamically changing sensor (human or machine) feeds.   Moreover, the individual user 
can be assigned a role and have pre-selected COIs already loaded for him.  In this 
example, the user is a JTAC.  The system will know this user type will want to know 
standard sensor information. All the user will need to load is his intended location, area 
of responsibility (AOR), and adjust any of the pre-selected COIs.  Such standard 
information could be the position of friendly units in his area, scheduled flyover of 
aircraft, known enemy hotspots, civilian use areas, etc.  These can be pared down by the 
user if he so desires.  Furthermore, the JTAC may enter additional COIs dependent on the 
specific mission.  Figure 4 shows a suggested GUI mock-up illustrating the initial input 
screen the user would access. 
 
 
Figure 4.   User GUI Mock-up 
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Once a role is selected, the pre-loaded COIs are presented on the right side of the 
screen.  If the user wishes to change any of these COIs, he may select MODIFY and 
continue to another screen (Figure 5) which will allow viewing or changing all conditions 
which compose that particular COI.   
 
 
Figure 5.   Modify/Add COI screen 
Once the user accepts all COIs, the user will continue back to the initial screen 
and define his operational AOR.  Moreover, the user can select how he would like to be 
alerted.  For instance, the alert may go out over some automated voice link or via email 
(if the user has that capability) or via a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA).  Furthermore, 
the PDA could be set to receive alerts in different forms, e.g., loud beeping or vibration.  
This depends on the mission and circumstances the user finds himself in.  While a PDA 
device would offer some level of sophistication, the use of a PDA is not a pre-requisite 
for implementation.  Simple alerts may include radio tones the user associates with 
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certain types of conditions or a text to speech (TTS) alert.  The TTS alerts the user by 
issuing an automated voice message that, once acknowledged, would cease.  Some 
potential alerts are addressed in Table 2.  
 
Alert General Properties 
There is an unplanned friendly 
medevac moving in your AOR.  
COI monitors for unplanned air contact.  Once identified, an 
automated voice message is sent over VHF.  “JTAC Lima 
Bravo, there is an unplanned friendly helo in your AOR.  
Position of contact is on grid ___ and 120 degrees relative to 
your current position.  Please acknowledge, over.” 
JTAC response: “Rgr, out” 
Civilians reported in your AOR.  These 
civilians were not planned for in the 
mission.  
COI monitors UAV and positional data.  The civilians are 
reported via UAV asset.  Automated voice report sent. 
“JTAC Lima Bravo, UAV reports new neutrals in your 
AOR. Position 120 degrees relative at 2km.  Do you want 
visual feed?  Please acknowledge, over.” 
JTAC response: “Copy, Affirmative” If he wishes to receive 
the video (and has the capability) or “Copy, out” if he does 
not want the feed. 
 
BFT signals departure from planned 
scheme of maneuver  
If PDA enabled: Alert tone sounds on the PDA (or if in a 
clandestine situation, vibrates).  The JTAC pushes the 
acknowledge button and views his PDA.  The new position 
of the blue force is displayed and blinks until acknowledged 
again.  This way, the system knows he received the alert and 
also knows he received the updated position.  All the JTAC 
has to do is push a button twice. 
Table 2.   Alert Methods and Properties 
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The ‘map input’ button will link to a user screen (Figure 6) which will allow the 
user to “click and drag” to select their assigned area of operation.  Coordinates identified 
here will feed the COIs with positional data relevant to the user.   
 
 
Figure 6.   Map AOR Input Screen 1 (Google Earth) 
In this exemplar, the JTAC needs to know a medevac helo has lifted off in his 
AOR.  The JTAC doesn’t require any further information pertaining to this helo unless 
the helo’s intended fight path intersects a block of space planned for ordnance or other 
aircraft to occupy.  If the helo inadvertently enters a standoff area, the danger to the helo 
would require suppression of fires until the helo has passed.  In this case, the JTAC 
would input a COI indicating immediate notification via combat PDA signal (Figure 7) 
that the helo will be intersecting the intended path of incoming ordnance.  At this stage, 
the JTAC will need to make a decision whether to call off the incoming bombing run or 
attempt to vector the medevac away from the operational area. 
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Figure 7.   Combat PDA 
 
1. Me-Centric Considerations 
Current efforts to link myriad sensor data focus on the net-centric aspects of 
network connectivity, security, etc.  However, this focus should not lose sight of the 
warfighter.  The typical terrorist target in asymmetrical warfare carries very little gear 
which allows him greater mobility.  Technology implementation should focus on 
reducing weight while increasing combat effectiveness.  Currently, a typical table of 
allowances (TOA) for a Machine Gun (MG) team carries 1000 rounds per gun.  At 7 lbs 
per 100 rounds, this equates to an additional 70 lbs dispersed through the team, and most 
times the gunner only carries 100 rounds leaving the remaining 63 lbs to be split between 
two people.  Consider also that the MG Team has a 6.6 lb spare barrel, flak, kevlar, two 
ceramic plates, while the team leader.  The ammo bearer has an M16 with 7 magazines, 
grenades, maybe even Personal Role Radios (PRRs), water, chow, personal night vision, 
and additional items prescribed by the unit.  The riflemen may also carry the personal 
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gear mentioned above, as well as an extra Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), 
ammunition, extra mortar rounds, extra Shoulder Launched Multi-Purpose Assault 
Weapon (SMAW) rockets, breaching kits, AT-4s, etc. Ounces become pounds, and 
pounds produce pain. Marines need to move quickly in a combat situation, and the 
extreme weight reduces their fluidity.26 
Thus, pushing information to the edges should not increase the amount of weight 
or equipment the individual unit must carry. Currently, the JTAC mission as part of the 
Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) requires a JTAC and three radio operators.   Their 
typical load out of equipment and arms involves lugging around a few hundred pounds of 
equipment.  The Marine Corps developed the Target Location Designation Handoff 
System (TLDHS) for their FACs as a replacement to the AN/PAQ-3 Modular Universal 
Laser Equipment (MULE).  The unit consists of a day-night laser rangefinder, a laser 
designator, and a computer component for digital message processing known as a Target 
Handoff System.  As evidenced from Figure 4, the additional equipment load for a JTAC 
utilizing the TLDHS involves two additional radios, a computer, laser binoculars and 
power supply.  The system must be calibrated prior to initial use which requires the 
operator to turn in a 360 degree manner to facilitate the system obtaining current 
bearings.   
The burden of using the TLDHS system is addressed in section IV of this paper.  
However, using a variant of the TLDHS in application of Theory II may be appropriate.   
                                                 
26 Sgt Maj Donnie R. Barrett, “For the record: A Marines Eye View of Better Combat Gear” 




Figure 8.   TLDHS Equipment load 
The current communications plan the JTAC follows places him on the Tactical 
Air Detection net (TADNET).  If multiple sections of aircraft exist, there will be multiple 
TADNETs.  A radio operator is concurrently on the TACP local or Supporting Arms 
Liaison Team (SALT) network.  This TACP net is a UHF net utilizing the AN-PRC-119F 
radio and is usually connected to the Air Officer (AO).  The Tactical Air Request Net 
(TARNET) requires monitoring also.  The guarding of the TARNET usually falls to an 
optional person who normally does not accompany the TACP, therefore the guarding of 
this net falls to someone else who may be focused on another radio net.  Moreover, 
another Marine carries the ground laser target designator (GLTD) and the Vector 21 
binocular laser range finder. 
Clearly, the impetus should not only be on linking sensor data but on how best to 
deliver this information to the warfighter without increasing his payload.  Indeed, 
technology should involve solutions to decrease his payload.  This ‘me-centric’ approach 
could have an ultimate goal of only one smart radio and one combat PDA in the field to 
free up personnel for other duties as well as increase the movement of personnel.  If the 
JTAC, for example, is limited to an OP due to the limited mobility of his TLDHS system, 
the military is potentially sacrificing mobility and forsaking an essential capability for 
adapting to a dynamic battlespace. 
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IV. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. IS SMART PUSH BETTER? 
If the overall goal of the GIG is to create a simple union of disparate sensor and 
intelligence data accessible through a vastly distributed database, DoD’s current approach 
might prove sufficient.  If the end-state seeks to link this same sensor data in order to 
deliver valued information where and when necessary without placing a burden on the 
warfighter to actively access it, the GIG probably will fall short. The as-is approach may 
often produce mission success, but it sacrifices many opportunities for increasing combat 
effectiveness and faster massing of force.  If IT can be utilized to assume much of the 
mental processing and physical tracking that now must consume people’s attention,  
potentially more targets can be engaged and threats identified more quickly.  This will 
lead to more choices for the warfighter by providing better knowledge.  Moreover, if the 
overall goal seeks to offer a useful tool within a reasonable time frame of a few years, the 
current approach fails.  Smart Push relies on utilizing existing technology in a smart way 
to allow warfighters to express conditions of interest and be alerted should their 
fundamental assumptions change or the worldview they hold becomes invalid in a way 
which will influence their mission. 
Clearly the warrior on the frontline will utilize whatever tools he possesses to 
complete the mission.  Currently, he uses bits and pieces of high technology but the true 
nature of a NC force has yet to materialize.  The GIG wishes to achieve a vision of 
readily accessible information through ubiquitous database accessibility.  Pulling this 
information will be the responsibility of the warfighter.  Someday, when a warrior fails to 
make a link between available information and the situation on the ground, someone 
above him in the chain of command might say, “Well Captain, the information was out 
there, you just didn’t pull it down quickly enough.”  This presents an unacceptable reality 
that could very well occur in the future.  Instead, efforts should focus on the best way to 
funnel valuable information to the warrior when and where needed.  Smart Push promises 
this type of information delivery where smart pull does not.  This does not presuppose the 
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warrior will make the proper decision 100% of the time, but it does work to ensure he has 
all relevant information possible prior to making the decision.  Thus, if a warrior fails in 
the future under a VIRT scenario, the Commander will say, “Well, Captain, you made the 
best decision you could with the information then available.” 
B. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT JTAC 
The use of the JTAC mission exemplifies how technology may be utilized in a 
smart way to push valued information where needed.  This scenario represents an 
extremely important mission but many more missions of similar importance need 
consideration.  These missions include a myriad of activities from calling in fire support 
or a battalion level maneuver effort.  These very important missions should be addressed 
first.  The idea of the GIG tends toward an approach where the information becomes 
available for easy access.  The onus needs to be taken off the warfighter and placed on 
technology to monitor ISR resources and push valued information.   
The JTAC mission serves as an excellent example because it shows very well the 
grass roots effort it took to get the joint CAS mission adopted and recognized across the 
services.  This effort mirrors the way ahead in smart technology delivery.  Instead of 
concentrating on a top-down “global” vision for technology that may never be 
accomplished, the focus should turn to current missions of high value where proper smart 
information delivery, e.g., VIRT, can deliver more capability today.  The sheer amounts 
of information that will become available and seemingly indispensible will undoubtedly 
increase.  For example, the success of the JTAC concept will lead to the creation of even 
more JTACs.  This effort may take the form of placing a JTAC with every company in 
the field.  Pursuing this approach without instituting some form of smart information 
management in the form of a VIRT filter may lead the services to inadvertently increase 
the risk of a clouded battlespace. Couple this risk with increased complexity of 
communication and it all points to an increase in the fog of war.   
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C. FROM JTAC TO OTHER JF MISSIONS 
The fusing of disparate sensor data across the services has continued to be a 
challenge for JFCOM.  Overcoming parochial interests in the name of better information 
delivery for all continues to confound even the most ardent supporters of “joint think.”  
However, these issues must be overcome.  Current efforts at joint integration focus on 
systems, e.g., Link 16.  The goal becomes fusing sensor data among platforms.  This 
effort has not necessarily led to more capability to the warrior on the ground.  The focus 
has centered on providing a COP.  This COP provides useful sensor data and positional 
reports to commanders but stops short of providing the real-time information necessary 
on the ground.  The desired end result is a more agile battlefield commander able to look 
at any aspect of the battlefield.  However, the goal should not be to make commanders 
omnipresent and omniscient.  Instead of focusing technology to enable a commander to 
drill down to the operational arena and second guess the guys on the ground, technology 
should focus on utilizing the available sensor data to enable a more effective warrior on 
the ground by providing everything relevant to achieving mission success.   
The most effective approach would involve determining what holds great 
importance to each service by considering in detail mission-specific examples.  These 
missions would become the focus of JFCOM.  The JTAC serves as only one of many 
examples the JFCOM could refine and prioritize.  Fusing sensors must focus on the 
information needs of the warrior.  The questions which should be posed revolve around 
how best to deliver additional capabilities today.  The lesson appears to involve pushing 
available valued information to the warrior who may then act faster than the enemy.  A 
commander, even with a 100% accurate COP, cannot hope to make decisions fast enough 
at this macro level to effect real change on the battlefield that will lead to victory.  The 
warrior still has the best hope of effecting real change in the battlefield outcome.  This 
warrior must be given every available tool to succeed. 
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D. DYNAMIC WORLD MODEL 
1. Self-Synchronization 
The DoD shift to joint thinking underlies a fundamental belief that new or 
enhanced capabilities may exist if only the individual forces can pool their resources to 
self-synchronize.  Indeed, within each individual service the pervasive belief is that an 
enhanced force can result from the synchronization of all relevant information sources.  
Self synchronization “…is a mode of interaction between two or more entities.”27 This 
effort involves two or more networked entities, shared awareness, a rule set and a value 
added interaction (Figure 9).  Mostly, the DoD effort has centered on a systems type of 
thinking.  This may seem natural because these existent systems take up a great deal of 
resources.  An example may be the overall logistics system or fire support systems.   
 
Figure 9.   Self-Synchronization Interaction (Gartska) 
The model in Figure 9 does not address hierarchical levels of concern.  For 
instance, the amount of control an entity possesses corresponds directly to the level in the 
hierarchy they personally hold.  For instance, a theatre commander has a different level of 
                                                 
27 John Gartska and David Alberts, Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework Version 2.0; 
June 2004, 175. 
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control then the warrior on the ground.  The model in Figure 9 as outlined in the Gartska 
NCW work, does not adequately address these levels.  A model developed by Professor 
Hayes-Roth, et al., goes further by stratifying the levels of concern and including such 
elements as time.  Figure 10 illustrates the Distributed Intelligent Control and 
Management (DICAM) architecture.  This presents a much clearer understanding of the 
elements involved in command and control.  The y axis serves to stratify “stored 
information at high to low levels of aggregation in order to serve the needs of controllers 
with corresponding levels of responsibility.”28  The Z axis corresponds to the different 
types of information and the X axis corresponds to time.  This architectural model goes 
much further in considering all elements necessary for critical information consideration 
including the relative level in the hierarchy of the decision maker, i.e., the controller. 
 
Figure 10.   The DICAM Reference Model (From: Hayes-Roth, et al.) 
The next step in this process requires the realization of a dynamic world model of 
each individual mission requiring VIRT implementation.  The JTAC mission should be a 
good starting point.  By implementing smart monitoring, the JTAC could receive great 
benefit by applying it to other potential information entities.  The scenario addressed in 
                                                 
28 Frederick Hayes-Roth, Lee D. Erman, Allan Terry, and Barbara Hayes-Roth. Distributed Intelligent 
Control and Management: Concepts, Methods and Tools for Developing DICAM Applications contained in 
IEEE publication. 237.  Available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/413/5910/00227923.pdf?arnumber=227923. Accessed March 2008. 
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this thesis does not include all of these items.  This thesis pares down the number of items 
in order to simplify experimentation and still show the value VIRT has to offer.  A 
number of items which could be monitored include:  
• the assigned altitude blocks for each aircraft. 
• the target that each aircraft is planning to attack (i.e., where his cursor is 
pointing). 
• the actual location of each aircraft and ordnance on board each aircraft. 
• the location of each indirect fire unit and the target location of any indirect 
fire unit’s current mission (with a trajectory line and warnings if it violates 
any assigned airspace). 
• the location and route of helicopters such as casualty evacuation 
(CASEVAC). 
• the current ATO status in timeline format. 
• unit boundaries and fire support coordination measures (updated as they 
change). 
• known and suspected enemy locations, friendly locations, and known 
civilian or neutral force locations.  
A majority of this information may be found in one system or another, but there is 
no unified system that puts it all together in one place, monitors for important changes, 
and makes it actionable for a mobile JTAC. 
E. WAY FORWARD 
1. Institute Experimentation and Proceed to Exercises  
The natural progression for this thesis requires actual experimentation and 
demonstration of the scenario.  Empire Challenge 2008 can be the venue for this 
demonstration.  This demonstration will be limited to available sensor information but 
will illustrate well the efficacy of VIRT implementation and the value that may be 
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garnered now.  This experiment can be set up to resemble closely the current command 
structure for a JTAC in the field.  A run-through of the scenario based on current 
technology or how the mission would be done without VIRT would constitute a baseline 
for comparison.  The measurement of available cognitive ability would be hard to 
measure but a simple survey of the person placed in both a current environment and 
VIRT environment could be useful in determining how much effort it takes to engage in 
both environments.  Moreover, traffic on the circuit could be measured to see if the actual 
number of bits is reduced or, more to the point, whether the percentage of valuable bits 
increases. 
2. Capture Integral Missions Now 
The theory of natural selection applies very well to the adoption of technology.  
Those who apply technology well will survive and those who fail will die.  Moore’s Law 
indicates computer power/memory doubles every 18 months.  The conservative four year 
lifetime estimate for a computer means total Internet computing power doubles every 10 
months.29  This natural process of technology growth does not mesh well with the 
decades old DoD acquisition process.  By the time a new technology application can 
work its way through the bureaucracy, it has become obsolete, the additional capabilities 
once promised now diminished or negated.  Thus, the return on investment is worse than 
zero: it becomes a negative sum gained even before considering the cost of lost 
opportunities.   
The idea of natural selection, however, may be utilized in favor of DoD 
technology discovery and implementation.  As stated before, the focus of technology 
implementation should be on capturing integral missions now.  Instead of pouring 
billions of dollars into grand or “global” schemes of integration, mission-specific 
applications should be captured  now.  The first missions to consider should be those that 
offer the greatest return on investment, e.g., the JTAC mission set.  Moreover, several 
potential agencies performing similar functions can propose their own unique solutions.  
Funding may be made to each one and the best idea will be the one adopted and 
                                                 
29 CCIA Security problems, 7. 
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implemented.  Furthermore, the overlapping of missions could be studied to discover the 
approach each service implements to solve a common problem.  Develop a comparison 
methodology and select the one that solves the problem best.  Make that particular 
service the lead agency and adopt the solution across all the services with a focus on 
interoperability.  In other words, select the best of the best and kill the rest. 
3. Build upon Current Tools 
The current stovepipe style of systems acquisition has had a negative impact on 
the interaction between the services.  The acquisition of the TLDHS serves as a great 
example technology adoption with little to no interoperability.  This system has a great 
deal of promise and could be scaled to encompass the other service’s needs.  The 
cumbersome and unreliable nature of the Marine Corps’ MULE program led to its 
retirement.  Its replacement, the TLDHS, has proved equally cumbersome as well as not 
interoperable.  As a result, JTACs in the field do not use it.   Voice communications is 
deemed more reliable and so is utilized almost exclusively.  However, the TLDHS does 
show promise and may be an example of how best to utilize developed technology to 
interconnect the services and build a common framework.   
4. Smart Push is the Way Forward 
JFCOM must balance a limited budget with the great demands of COCOMs and 
military personnel to include technology throughout most aspects of warfighting.  
JFCOM must advocate and insist upon the utilization of flattening technologies that 
interoperate among all the services.  This may include a modification of the JFCOM 
mission as the central clearing agency for technology integration among the services.  
There has to be a clearing house for technology insertion into U.S. forces.  If the JFCOM 
does not become the central agency for technology alignment, they will be forced to 
become the central agency for technology fusion.  This fusion will increasingly become a 
hopeless task.  As each of the services continue to procure service-specific technology 
with no common integrative architecture, the fusion of these technologies between the 
services will become an insurmountable task.  Moreover, the time it takes to implement 
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anything must be considered.  No longer can this nation stand idly by and hope its 
expensive efforts will yield good results.  Our adversaries have woken up and adopt 
technology to their use at an ever increasing rate.   
Clearly terrorists are adopting technology without large acquisition projects.  
They form their own networks based around current technologies including cell phones, 
the Internet and cheap explosive devices.  The power of this type of fusion has been 
painfully obvious in both Iraq and Afghanistan where remote bomb detonation and 
relaying of U.S. force positions utilize existing technology.  However, the difference in 
scale of investment between the U.S. and terrorists is staggering.  While the U.S. invests 
billions of dollars in large acquisition projects, the terrorists are utilizing available 
technology and adapting it to meet their goals.  Perhaps the U.S. should shift its focus 
from the large projects towards more effective practical solutions focused on mission-
specific areas. 
Current approaches to technology software and hardware implementation follow a 
roughly ten-year cycle of acquisition and integration.  This is too slow by an order of 
magnitude!  The world is changing too fast and this cycle will not lead to a modern force 
infused with new capabilities capitalizing on technology implementation.  In The World 
is Flat, author Thomas Friedman utilizes an analogy of the lions and the gazelles.  Each 
night the gazelle sleeps knowing that tomorrow it must run faster than the lion if it wishes 
to live.  Each night the lion also sleeps knowing tomorrow he must run faster than the 
gazelle if he wishes to live.  So, regardless of whether you are the lion or gazelle, when 
morning arrives, everyone wakes up and runs.  It appears as if the U.S. military has 
woken up but believes it can walk and win.  The adoption of technology must quicken 
and be implemented smartly if the U.S. wishes to run.  The good news – the U.S. has 
woken up.  The bad news – the U.S. has not started running. 
F. FUTURE WORK 
• Extend the concept of VIRT to include other humans in the loop e.g., the 
coordinating JTAC in charge of several field-level JTACs. 
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• As discussed in section III of this paper, the human animal has a limited 
cognitive capacity to process information.  Professors Miller and Chattuck of 
the Naval Postgraduate School have developed a Dynamic Model of Situated 
Cognition (DMSC) which can be well applied to the JTAC, including more 
robust M2M and human interface technology.  While many models of NCW 
focus on the technological aspects of a system, the DMSC was developed in 
order to represent relationships between technology and humans in the 
system.30  A future study should employ this model in the context of the 
scenario contained in this work.   
G. FINAL ANALYSIS 
This paper has presented a true-to-life use-case scenario for comparing current 
information delivery to a smart push alternative.  As the sheer amount of information 
increases, current practices will not yield better results.  The JTAC currently utilizes three 
radio personnel to keep up with information updates.  This process does not present the best 
utilization of technological resources and available computing power.  By allowing the JTAC 
to specify certain COI’s and enabling computers to manage the updates, the amount of 
information the JTAC must consider will be reduced to a manageable level.  This allows the 
JTAC or any other entity utilizing smart push to focus more on the mission thus becoming 
more agile in the process.  “For our organizations to get the best results, the human resources 
need to spend their limited time on the most important things.”31  The smart pull envisioned 
by the DoD in the form of the GIG may provide a static repository of information but does 
not provide the warfighter with a tool to dynamically deliver information to the warfighter 
when and where needed the most – the battlefield.  Instead of the DoD beginning at the top 
with an enterprise-wide solution, they should focus on the most valuable missions first.  The 
JTAC presents just that type of mission and this should be where the effort begins. 
                                                 
30 Nita Lewis Miller and Lawrence G. Shattuck, “A Dynamic Process Model for the Design and 
Assessment of Network Centric Systems,” for 2006 Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium The State of the Art and the State of the Practice; 2. 
31 Rick Hayes-Roth, “Model Based Communication Networks and VIRT: Filtering Information by 
Value to Improve Collaborative Decision-Making,” for 2005 10th International Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposium; 20. 
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